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​The Fraudulent Finance Officer

When an executive abruptly quits her job, it sets off an internal audit that uncovers her five-year fraud.

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Fabrina Carr joined CA Clubs, athletic and social clubs scattered throughout the Northeast, in 2012 as a secretary. Soon after, she was promoted to chief financial officer. As the financial director, she had overall control of the company's finances with little oversight, and she managed a small group of employees.

In late 2017, Carr phoned her work colleague from Bermuda to announce her resignation. This event, like any other unexpected executive departure, triggered an internal audit. The CEO of the company called Gina Cupler, the director of internal audit, whose team quickly started assessing the situation.

Internal audit requested emails and reports for corporate credit cards, travel expenses, and department expenses for the previous two years. Review of travel found significant and unusual spending activity, an excessive amount of expensive business trips, and a suspicious expense of $7,213. Cupler reviewed Carr's credit card statements and saw that the expense was paid to a funeral home. Public burial records revealed that Carr's sister had passed away and that the burial service was conducted by the funeral home noted in the credit card statement. A keyword search in Carr's email account captured correspondence with the funeral home, as well as an itemized invoice.

Cupler decided to dig deeper into CA Clubs' banking activity. Records indicated that Carr wrote checks to various people and vendors, yet the vendor master file did list those check recipients. When Cupler asked Carr's employees about the vendor master file, they told her that Carr maintained administrative control of the accounting system. This gave her unrestricted access to manipulate vendor records and transactions without detection. In addition, bank statements revealed five $100,000 wire transfers to an offshore account just before Carr resigned, which she approved herself.

Cupler notified the CEO of internal audit's findings and asked her team to expand the investigation to all five years of Carr's employment. Internal audit identified 1,464 personal transactions that started one month after Carr joined the company and carried forward for almost five years. Details of her unbelievable spending spree included 51 flights, 56 hotel stays, and 270 shopping transactions.

Cupler also inquired with the external auditors about their work over the past few years. Because the current external auditors had recently taken over the account, internal audit had to request copies of the audit reports from the previous auditors. The reports included findings about poor record keeping and insufficient evidence to support expenses and vendor payments. However, all interactions with the external auditors were through Carr, who never shared audit reports with the board. And the board never requested to see them.

Cupler was perplexed at how this could happen, so she instructed her team to perform more research into Carr's background. Her human resources (HR) file included a black and white copy of an accounting degree from Whatsworth College. An inquiry with the college found no record of Carr's attendance. The degree was forged, and HR never reviewed Carr's education or accounting certifications. The team then looked into Carr's criminal and past employment records, which revealed a history of theft and writing of fraudulent checks.

At the first evidence of fraud, Cupler notified the authorities and kept them abreast of developments. Carr was arrested at the airport upon her return from Bermuda and was questioned by authorities about the money that was missing. Carr claimed she loaned $500,000 to her boyfriend, a Nigerian man who she met online. A subordinate of Carr testified at the court hearing that Carr texted her outside of business hours instructing her to make payments to the man. Despite being suspicious about the payments, she felt bullied and did not want to question her supervisor. The prosecutor argued that these transactions were the reason Carr eventually resigned from CA Clubs — she had taken $500,000 to help her boyfriend leave Nigeria, but he never repaid her. The judge sentenced Carr to six years in jail, but she was not ordered to repay any costs because she declared bankruptcy.

CA Clubs sent an announcement to its 7,000 members sharing information about Carr's conviction and explaining that a new management structure was put in place with more rigorous financial processes to better protect the company. The incident was a painful reminder of what can go wrong without adequate checks and balances in place.  

Lessons Learned

  • A pre-employment background check is a key preventive control. Verification that a person is who he or she claims to be is important, especially when it comes to meeting the compliance requirements with hiring legally authorized citizens. The background check also provides an opportunity to check a person's criminal record, education, employment history, and other information to confirm its validity.
  • Validation checks also should be performed when internal employees are promoted or move into new roles. Just because they have the skills, experience, and qualifications for the roles they were initially hired for does not mean they are immediately qualified for other roles in the company. HR should verify that their education, certifications, and any other skill sets are legitimate to meet the requirements of the new role.
  • Reliance on a single person to control all aspects of financial transactions is never a good idea because it creates opportunities to commit fraud. Small organizations may need to get creative when it comes to segregation of duties. Board members for small not-for-profit organizations can take on an active financial governance role by reviewing financial information monthly.
  • Thresholds should be in place around bank and credit card transactions with any override of these controls placed with the board. Companies also should work with their bank and credit card vendors to put automatic controls in place to prevent overspending.
  • Small companies may not have the resources to look at the cultural aspects of their work environment. However, board leadership can have an active presence and provide employees with an outlet outside of their normal chain of command, such as a whistleblower hotline, to report suspicious or unethical activity.

William Byrne
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About the Author



William ByrneWilliam Byrne<p>​William Byrne, CIA, CPA, CISA, is an audit and compliance professional in Spanish Fort, Ala.<br></p>


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